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Abstract
We propose a structural model in which utility-maximizing investors strategically
switch between the fundamental and chartist trading strategy in a market with asym-
metric information. Their adaptive trading behavior generates an evolving price
discovery process that reshapes the market environment, which then feeds back on
their subsequent trading actions. The model implies that the price is more informa-
tive in terms of incorporating new information about the fundamental value when the
asset is significantly mispriced and when the information is more precise. These the-
oretical predictions are supported by empirical evidence based on I/B/E/S data from
January 2000 to December 2015.
Keywords Price informativeness · Trading heterogeneity · Market efficiency ·
Price discovery
JEL Classification G12 · D52 · D83
1 Introduction
The financial market provides an important function of price discovery. The market
price aggregates information embedded in investors’ trading activities. In an efficient
market, new information is incorporated quickly into the price through the trading of
rational investors. However, in reality, investors may have different perceptions of the
same information (Harrison and Kreps 1978) and act selectively on the information
that is more likely to be impounded into the price (Froot et al. 1992). As a result,
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the market price reflects the aggregation of opinions, which does not necessarily
convey all information available. The fact that investors are not always rational and
the presence of asymmetric information further complicate the information-revealing
process. How information is transmitted into the market price via investors’ complex
trading behavior remains an open question.
This paper seeks to understand how investors’ trading behavior responds to new
information under a dynamic market environment, and how their collective actions
shape price informativeness. We propose a structural model with heterogeneous and
boundedly rational investors, who strategically switch between informed and unin-
formed trading to maximize their utilities in a market with asymmetric information.
Due to information friction, investors form diverse perceptions on the attractiveness
of relatively informed fundamental strategy, which considers all available informa-
tion about the fundamentals and bets the price to reflect value, and the uninformed
chartist strategy, which extrapolates price movements from historical trends only. As
the market is not always efficient (Shiller 2003), investors in our model do not always
act on the fundamental strategy as they may be better off switching away from it
under certain circumstances. In other words, investors respond to information selec-
tively. Therefore, in our model, whether the price is informative or not is the outcome
of aggregate actions of all investors instead of pre-determined. The adaptive trading
activities of investors shape the price discovery process and lead to various degrees
of price informativeness, measured by the extent to which new information is incor-
porated into the price. The price is considered to be more informative if it is more
responsive to new information. We focus on the price responsiveness to new informa-
tion flows as opposed to the full information level. This is because old information
may become stale or even obsolete as new information arrives (O’Hara 2003).
How much existing information has been reflected in the price is, however, cru-
cial for the subsequent price to incorporate new information, as it affects the extent to
which agents act on information. If the current price reflects little information about
the fundamental value such that the asset is significantly mispriced, the potential gain
for trading such an asset is large once the price incorporates all information. Our
model implies that, when the asset is originally more significantly mispriced, more
agents are motivated to adopt the fundamental strategy, which buys the asset when it
is undervalued and sells it when it is overvalued. The trading actions of fundamental-
ists drive the price towards its fundamental value and helps incorporate information
about the fundamental into the price. An increase in the number of fundamentalists
that act on information improves the subsequent price informativeness. Such a find-
ing is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which predicts stock
prices to reflect all available information. Intuitively, when new information arrives,
the market will not react exclusively to such news but also react to existing infor-
mation that is not yet reflected in the price. As a result, the price appears to respond
more sensitively to new events when less existing information has been incorporated
into the price. In other words, greater mispricing today is associated with a more
informative price in the future.
The information quality is another important factor for agents’ adaptive trading
behavior and the price discovery process. Our model shows that more precise infor-
mation can either improve or undermine the price informativeness, depending on
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the relative trading power of heterogeneous agents. Jin and Myers (2006) find that
the market price contains more private information in a more transparent environ-
ment when the information is less noisy (or more precise), while Dasgupta et al.
(2010) show the opposite. Our model reconciles these two distinct results by show-
ing a nonlinear relation between price informativeness and information quality that
is contingent on the relative trading power of fundamentalists who act on their pri-
vate information on fundamental value, and chartists whose trading behavior relies
on historical price trends. Our model predicts that, more precise information always
increases the market fraction of fundamentalist, as the reduction in information risk
renders the fundamental strategy more attractive. While a larger number of funda-
mentalists generally leads to a more informative market price, there are exceptions.
Our model also predicts that when market information is sufficiently precise, it is
impossible for chartists to outweigh fundamentalists in their contribution to the price
discovery. However, when information is relatively noisy, chartists may contribute
more to price informativeness than fundamentalists under certain circumstances.
Given that more precise information increases the fraction of fundamentalists, this
implies that initial improvement in price quality could lead to a fall in price infor-
mativeness, but price informativeness will ultimately increase as information quality
continues to improve.
The impact of asset mispricing and information quality on price informativeness
is supported by empirical evidence based on data from the Institutional Brokers’
Estimate System (I/B/E/S). As more precise information indicates lower informa-
tion risk, we follow (Johnson 2004) and use the dispersion among analysts’ forecasts
as a proxy for information quality. As analysts act like fundamentalists in utilizing
both private and public information to estimate the value of the asset (Cooper et al.
2001; Barber et al. 2010), each estimated price target proxies well the conditional
expected fundamental value of the underlying asset by each fundamentalist. Under
the assumption of uniformly distributed private signals, the Bayesian update in our
setup suggests that estimated fundamental value is uniformly distributed around the
true fundamental value. Therefore, we proxy the fundamental value by the median
value of analysts’ price targets. The asset mispricing is measured by the absolute
difference between the market price and its fundamental value. Finally, price infor-
mativeness is measured by the degree to which the market price changes in response
to updates of the fundamental value. The estimation results show that the market price
is more informative when the asset is more significantly mispriced. As the condition
for a negative relation between price informativeness and information precision is
quite restrictive, our empirical results document the dominant effect of more precise
information in increasing price informativeness.
Related literature In rational expectations equilibrium (REE) models, a popular
framework to explore the implications of the market microstructure in price informa-
tiveness is where noise trading has no price impact, and noise traders always suffer
losses. In the behavioral noise trader approach, however, uninformed or irrational
trading can affect the market price and be profitable and, as a consequence, sustains
their prevalence in the financial market (De Long et al. 1990; Shleifer and Summers
1990). This paper follows the latter approach to study the impact of heterogeneous
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and adaptive trading on price informativeness. It further argues that investors may
choose to ignore market information and act irrationally since uninformed trading
yields greater utility in certain market environments. Our study contributes to the
understanding of how selective reaction to information based on adaptive trading
shapes price informativeness.
Our model is characterized by investors who interact with each other and switch
between the fundamental and chartist trading strategies to maximize their utilities.
These heterogeneous agents are assumed to use either fundamental or technical anal-
ysis to form their expectations of future asset price movements. This setup is closely
related to, inter alia, Day and Huang (1990), Lux (1995), Brock and Hommes (1998),
and He and Westerhoff (2005), Huang et al. (2010) and Lof (2012). In these mod-
els, the fraction of fundamentalists and chartists is either fixed (Day and Huang
1990; Huang and Zheng 2012) or exogeneously determined by some random switch-
ing process (Lux 1995; Brock and Hommes 1998; He and Westerhoff 2005; Lof
2012). The hypothesis on evolutionary selection among different forecasting rules
is supported by both experimental and empirical evidence (Boswijk et al. 2007;
Anufriev and Hommes 2012; Lof 2015). This strand of literature highlights that the
notion investors can switch between heterogeneous strategies, which implies that
they understand both fundamental and technical analysis. Consistent with such an
implication, each investor in our model forecasts the future price movements using
both valuation methodologies and utilizing information drawn from them. This aspect
of the model is closely related to the work of Barberis et al. (2018), who model
investors’ demand as a weighted average of both types of valuation. Following He
and Zheng (2016), this paper adds another layer to this class of models by intro-
ducing information friction and endogenizing the fraction of fundamentalists in the
market. We show that, in a market with incomplete information, investors who seek
to maximize their utilities will follow either the fundamental or the chartist strat-
egy adaptively. However, because of information dispersion, some investors expect
the fundamental strategy to outperform the chartist strategy, while others believe the
opposite. This leads to heterogeneous trading in the market. Changing market envi-
ronments, i.e. asset price and information quality, affect investors’ perceptions on the
performance of heterogeneous strategies, which may motivate them to switch from
one strategy to another. Based on such a framework, we add to current literature that
focuses on simulation-based solutions in a complex dynamic system by documenting
analytically the relation between price informativeness and adaptive heterogeneous
trading activities. Moreover, these theoretical findings were well supported by empir-
ical evidence drawn from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) that
provide analysts forecasts on listed companies’ value. The empirical evidence fur-
ther supports the endogenized trading heterogneeity documented in Shi and Zheng
(2018).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 conducts a comparative analysis to understand the role of different market
factors on the fraction of fundamentalists and price informativeness. Section 5 tests
the theoretical predictions using I/B/E/S data. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Themodel
We consider a continuum of [0, 1] agents (i.e. fund managers) trading on one risky
and one risk-free asset in a market with incomplete information. The risk-free inter-
est rate is normalized to 0. Each agent observes a private but noisy signal about the
fundamental value. Conditional on their signals and the prevailing market environ-
ment, agents make trading decisions to maximize their utility. The trading of the risky
asset will follow either a fundamental strategy, characterized by the expectation that
the market price reflects its fundamental value, or a chartist strategy, which relies on
extrapolation of past price trends to forecast the asset price. Agents evaluate the opti-
mal utility for each strategy and place trading orders based on the strategy that yields
a higher utility. We now turn to describe the model in detail.
2.1 Information structure
In each period t , the latest logarithmic fundamental value of the risky asset θt is
realized but not revealed to the public. The prior of θt is governed by
θt = θ t−1 + et ,
where et follows an improper uniform distribution. The log of historical fundamental
value θ t−1 = (θt−1, θt−2, . . . , θ0) is public information for all investors at time t .
Upon the realization of θt , each agent i ∈ [0, 1] observes a private signal about
the fundamental value, xi,t = θt + εi,t , where εi,t is the information noise term
that is independently and uniformly distributed over [−εt , εt ]. Conditional on his
private signal xi,t , an agent i’s posterior update of the mean and variance of the real
fundamental value θt is
E
(
θt |xi,t
) = xi,t
V ar
(
θt |xi,t
) = ε2t .
2.2 Asset allocation under heterogeneous strategies
All agents share a common mean-variance utility function1
Ui,t+1 = yi,tEi(Rt+1) − α
2
y2i,tV ari(Rt+1), (1)
where α is the absolute risk aversion coefficient, Ei(Rt ) and V ari(Rt ) are agent i’s
expected mean and variance of the return on the risky asset, and yi,t is the amount
of capital allocated to the risky asset at period t . Each agent seeks to maximize his
1Such a mean-variance utility function is equivalent to constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility
function when agents wealth are normally distributed.
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utility by allocating capital between the risky and the risk-free assets. Solving the
optimization problem yields the optimal demand for the risky asset:
yi,t = Ei(Rt+1)
αV ari(Rt+1)
. (2)
We assume that each agent is offered investment advice by his research team that
analyzes investment opportunities based on two prevailing and complementary meth-
ods — fundamental and technical (or chartist) strategies. We focus on these two
strategies for several reasons. First, they are commonly used in the financial indus-
try and frequently observed in laboratory experiments (Anufriev and Hommes 2012).
Second, in practice, it is costly to hire different researchers to conduct a wide variety
of analysis, and therefore it makes sense to focus on the commonly used strategies
due to resource constraint. Third, trading based on fundamental and chartist anal-
ysis is representative to capture key financial market patterns (Lux 1995; He and
Westerhoff 2005; Huang et al. 2012).
Based on fundamental analysis, the price is expected to revert to its fundamental
value so that an agent will buy (sell) the risky asset when the price is below (above)
the fundamental value. Such a fundamental strategy is relatively informed because it
utilizes all available information about the fundamental value. As the prior distribu-
tion of θt is uniform and the signal is also uniformly distributed around θt , agent i’s
posterior update of θt is uniformly distributed over the interval
[
xi,t − εt , xi,t + εt
]
.
Let pt be the logarithmic price of the risky asset at period t and Rt = pt − pt−1
be the return. The expected mean and variance of return in period t + 1 based on
fundamental analysis are as follows:
E
f
i (Rt+1) = Ei
(
θt+1|xi,t
) − pt = xi,t − pt , (3)
V ar
f
i (Rt+1) = V ari
(
θt+1|xi,t
) = ε2t . (4)
In contrast, based on technical or chartist analysis, the expected price and variance
of agent i are independent of her signal xi but rely on historical price patterns such
that
Eci (Rt+1) = β (pt − vt ) (5)
V arci (Rt+1) = β2σ 2, (6)
where vt is a reference price or a price trend that is derived from historical price
movements of the asset based on some technical analysis2, β measures the extrap-
olation of price deviations from the trend, and σ 2 is a heuristic expectation of the
variance of the asset returns, which can be derived from the variance of historical
returns. The reference price vt can be a moving average, a supporting (resistance)
price level, or any index derived from technical analysis. In particular, when vt prices
and β > (<)0, the strategy c is essentially a time-series momentum (contrarian) strat-
egy. A positive value of pt − vt indicates a bullish sentiment, while a negative value
2We keep the specification of vt open to make the results more general. The results in this paper hold if vt
is i.e. a moving average of the past price such that vt = ∑i=ni=1ωipt−i , where ωi is the weight for the price
i periods ago.
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means a bearish sentiment. For now, we keep the specification of vt open to keep the
model general. Such a chartist strategy is uninformed as it ignores the information on
the fundamental value.
Note from Eq. 2 that different perceptions about future price movements result in
different optimal demands for the risky asset. Substituting (3) and Eq. 4 into Eq. 2
yields the optimal demand for the risky asset based on fundamental analysis
y
f
i,t =
xi,t − pt
αε2t
. (7)
Information dispersion leads to diverse expectation of the fundamental value and
therefore different demand for the risky asset, even if agents adopt the same funda-
mental strategy. Let κt = |θ t − pt | and κi,t =
∣∣xi,t − pt
∣∣ be the actual and expected
degree of mispricing, respectively. The higher the value of κt , the greater the degree
of mispricing and the less efficient the price is in incorporating existing informa-
tion about the fundamental. When κt = 0, that is, θ t = pt , the price fully reflects
the fundamental value and all existing information about the fundamental is incor-
porated into the price. According to Eq. 7, the amount of capital moving in or out
of the risky asset based on fundamental analysis (
∣∣∣yfi,t
∣∣∣) is an increasing function
of one’s expected degree of mispricing. It means that a transaction based on funda-
mental strategy is more aggressive when the price is less efficient in incorporating
existing information.
Similarly, the optimal demand for the risky asset conditional on chartist analysis
is obtained by substituting (5) and Eq. 6 into Eq. 2:
yci,t =
pt − vt
αβσ 2
. (8)
The demand function based on chartist analysis is common for all agents. As trade
based on Eq. 8 is uninformative about the fundamental value, it captures uninformed
trading activities. Equations 7 and 8 corresponds to the “value” and the “growth”
signals in Barberis et al. (2016).
2.3 Choosing between heterogeneous strategies
We follow He and Zheng (2016) to formalize the choice of trading strategies. In par-
ticular, we assume that each agent can only select one of the two investment strategies
specified in Eqs. 7 and 8, which are grounded in fundamental and chartist analysis,
respectively. The true data generating process of the asset price is hard to predict
as there could be feedback effects coming from trading actions to asset prices that
alter the original data generating process of the asset price. Agents understand that
fundamental and chartist analysis are imperfect frameworks to predict stock price
movements, but there is no evidence that other methods consistently and significantly
outperform these two. Moreover, it takes time and resources to explore useful alter-
native valuation methods but trading requires quick actions. Due to the constraints of
risk exposure, time and resources, they have no incentive to choose strategies other
than the fundamental and the chartist strategies offered by their research teams.
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Given the market complexity and uncertainty, there is no reliable rule of thumb to
tell which strategy does a better job of forecasting future price movements. Against
this backdrop, all agents treat the two strategies equally in terms of their forecasting
precision. All agents consider themselves to be price takers and do not consider the
impact of their trading on the asset price. We therefore assume that each agent simul-
taneously and independently chooses the strategy that yields a higher utility after
observing the latest price and the private signal. Agents’ choice of strategy can be
summarized in the following two steps.
First, each agent calculates the maximum expected utility based on the fundamen-
tal and the chartist strategies, which can be obtained respectively by substituting (7)
and Eq. 8 into Eq. 1:
Ef
(
Ui,t+1
) =
(
xi,t − pt
)2
2αε2t
, (9)
Ec
(
Ui,t+1
) = (pt − vt )
2
2ασ 2
, (10)
where Ef
(
Ui,t+1
) = maxEfi
(
Ui,t+1
)
and Ec
(
Ui,t+1
) = maxEc (Ui,t+1
)
are agent
i’s expected maximum utilities based on the fundamental and the chartist strategies.
Second, each agent compares the maximum expected utilities from the two strate-
gies and selects the one with a higher expected utility. Let x̄t be the threshold signal
that makes an agent indifferent between the two strategies such that Ef
(
Ui,t+1
) =
Ec
(
Ui,+1
)
when xi,t = x̄t , that is,
(x̄t − pt )2
2αε2t
= (pt − vt )
2
2ασ 2
Solving for x̄t yields
xt
± = ±ε (pt − vt )
σ
+ pt
Let xmt and x
M
t denote the two solutions of x̄ such that
xmt = min(xt±) = −
εt (pt − vt )
σ
+ pt , and (11)
xMt = max(xt±) =
εt (pt − vt )
σ
+ pt . (12)
When Ef
(
Ui,t+1
) = Ec (Ui,t+1
)
, an agent is indifferent between the fundamen-
tal and the chartist strategies. In that case, we follow the conventional wisdom and
assume that he will choose the fundamental strategy. Clearly, when pt = vt , all
agents will choose the fundamental strategy as Ef
(
Ui,t+1
) ≥ Ec (Ui,t+1
) = 0 for
any i. Given that Ef
(
Ui,t+1
)
is a nonlinear function of xi while Ec
(
Ui,t+1
)
is inde-
pendent of xi,t , as illustrated in Fig. 1, Ef
(
Ui,t+1
) ≥ Ec (Ui,t+1
)
when xi,t ≥ xMt or
xi,t ≤ xMt , and Ef
(
Ui,t+1
)
< Ec
(
Ui,t+1
)
otherwise. To put it differently, an agent
will choose the chartist strategy if his signal falls into the interval (xmt , x
M
t ) but will
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Fig. 1 Threshold signals. The solid and dashed lines plot the expected utility for fundamental and chartist
strategy respectively. The two strategies yield the same utility if private signal xi,t falls on the thresholds
xmt or x
M
t
choose the fundamental strategy otherwise. Therefore, the actual trading order placed
by agent i is given by
yi,t =
{
y
f
i,t if xi,t ≤ xmt or xi,t ≥ xMt ;
yci,t if xi,t ∈ (xmt , xMt )
. (13)
To facilitate our analysis below, agent i is considered to be a fundamentalist if yi,t =
y
f
i,t , and a chartist if yi,t = yci,t . Clearly, Eq. 13 indicates that an agent will become a
fundamentalist if and only if he expects the degree of mispricing is sufficiently large
such that κi,t =
∣∣xi,t − pt
∣∣ ≥ εt |pt − vt | /σ . The result suggests that agents whose
signals fall in the tails of the distribution are more likely to favor the fundamental
strategy.
2.4 Market fraction of fundamentalists
Changes in the asset price or the information structure shape the market fractions of
fundamentalists and chartists. Holding all else constant, when the price changes, the
two threshold signals xmt and x
M
t will also change, which in turn affects the number
of agents whose signals fall into (xmt , x
M
t ) and thus the market fraction of each type
of agent. Changes in the fundamental value or the distribution of new signals have
similar effects. We take into account these factors and study how investors switch
between the two strategies in response to the dynamic market environment.
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Denote mt as the fraction of fundamentalists in the market. As the market consists
of fundamentalists and chartists only, the fraction of chartists is then given by 1−mt .
Since xi is uniformly distributed over [θt − εt , θt + εt ] and chartists are agents whose
signals fall into (xmt , x
M
t ), we consider the fraction of fundamentalists under five
scenarios.
First, if θt + εt < xmt or θt − εt > xMt , then all agents’ signals fall below xmt
or above xMt , which suggests that all agents become fundamentalists according to
Eq. 13 and mt = 1. Second, if θt + εt < xMt and θt − εt > xmt , then all sig-
nals fall into (xmt , x
M
t ) so that all agents are chartists and mt = 0. Third, if xmt ∈
[θt − εt , θt + εt ] and θt + εt < xMt , then agents whose signals fall into
[
θt − εt , xmt
]
become fundamentalists and mt = x
m
t − θt + εt
2εt
. Fourth, if xMt ∈ [θt − εt , θt + εt ]
and θt − εt > xmt , then agents whose signals fall into
[
θt − εt , xMt
]
become fun-
damentalists and mt = θt + εt − x
M
t
2εt
. Finally, if xmt , x
M
t ∈ [θt − εt , θt + εt ], then
mt = 2εt − x
M
t + xmt
2εt
. To summarize, the fraction of fundamentalists in the market
is given by
mt =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if 	1
0 if 	2
xmt −θt+εt
2εt
if 	3
θt+εt−xMt
2εt
if 	4
2εt−xMt +xmt
2εt
if 	5
(14)
where
	1 =
{
xmt , x
M
t | θt + εt < xmt or θt − εt > xMt
}
	2 =
{
xmt , x
M
t | θt + εt < xMt and θt − εt > xmt
}
	3 =
{
xmt , x
M
t | xmt ∈ [θt − εt , θt + εt ] and θt + εt < xMt
}
	4 =
{
xmt , x
M
t | xMt ∈ [θt − εt , θt + εt ] and θt − εt > xmt
}
	5 =
{
xmt , x
M
t | xmt , xMt ∈ [θt − εt , θt + εt ]
}
As signals are uniformly distributed over [θt − εt , θt + εt ], conditional on Eq. 14,
the average signal of fundamentalists is
ηt =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
θt if 	1
0 if 	2
xmt +θt−εt
2 if 	3
θt+εt+xMt
2 if 	4
(xmt )
2−(xMt
)2+4εt θt
2xmt −2xMt +4εt if 	5
, (15)
Given the average signal of fundamentalists, ηt , as specified in Eq. 15, the average
demand for the risky assets by all fundamentalists, denoted as ȳf , can be calculated
by replacing the individual signal xi,t in Eq. 7 with ηt so that
ȳt
f = ηt − pt
αε2t
. (16)
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2.5 Asset price formation
All agents, after selecting their strategies, submit trading orders to a market maker
according to Eq. 13. Following Day and Huang (1990) and Lux (1995), we assume
the market maker updates the price according to the aggregate demand Dt , the sum
of all trading orders:
Rt+1 = pt+1 − pt = γDt , (17)
where γ measures the marginal impact of the aggregate demand on the price change,3
and Dt is given by
Dt =
∑
i∈[0,1]
yi,t = mt ȳt f + (1 − mt) yct
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
θt − pt
αε2t
if 	1
pt − vt
αβσ 2
if 	2
xmt +θt−εt
2 − pt
αε2t
xmt −θt+εt
2εt
+ pt − vt
αβσ 2
θt+εt−xmt
2εt
if 	3
θt+εt+xMt
2 − pt
αε2t
θt+εt−xMt
2εt
+ pt − vt
αβσ 2t−1
xMt −θt+εt
2εt
if 	4
(xmt )
2−(xMt
)2+4εt θt
2xmt −2xMt +4εt − pt
αε2t
2εt−xMt +xmt
2εt
+ pt − vt
αβσ 2t−1
xMt −xmt
2εt
if 	5
. (18)
The second equality line is obtained by substituting mt , ȳt f and yct with Eqs. 14, 16,
and 8 respectively and by substituting ηt in Eq. 16 with Eq. 15.
3 Comparative analysis
Agents’ investment decisions critically depend on howmuch existing information has
been incorporated into the price, how precise the private signals are, and how bullish
or bearish the market sentiment, and their collective actions determine how effi-
cient the subsequent price incorporates new information. In this section, we conduct
comparative analysis to understand the dynamic interaction between agents trading
behavior and asset price as well as its implications for price informativeness.
3.1 Market fraction of fundamentalists
The degree of mispricing, κt , captures howmuch existing information has been incor-
porated into the current price, which is an important measure of price efficiency. The
imperfect information leads to heterogeneous expectation on the degree of mispric-
ing, which shapes the market structure with different composition of fundamentalists
3Including the supply shock S ∼ N (0, σ 2s
)
to the right hand side of Eq. 17 does not affect the main results.
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and chartists. Lemma 3.1 summarizes the relation between the market fraction of
fundamentalists, mt , and the degree of mispricing, κt . Other than some specific cir-
cumstances, mt increases with κt , which means that agents are more motivated to
be fundamentalists if the current asset is more significantly mispriced. The market
fraction of fundamentalists decreases with the degree of mispricing if and only if the
fundamental and the chartist strategies suggest opposite trading directions (i.e. one
is buying and the other is selling), the change in price efficiency originates from a
change in price, and either one of the three conditions are satisfied: (i) both threshold
signals xmt and x
M
t fall into [θt − εt , θt + εt ] (condition 	5), or (ii) the information
noise is sufficiently large (εt > σ ) and one and only one of xmt and x
M
t falls into
[θt − εt , θt + εt ] (condition 	3 or 	4).
Lemma 3.1 ∂mt/∂κt ≥ 0 except when ∂ |pt − vt | /∂κt = 1 and either condition (i)
	5, (ii) εt > σ and 	3, or (iii) εt > σ and 	4, is satisfied.
Proof see Appendix.
Remarks The intuition can be gained by tracking the source of the change in κt ,
which may be triggered by a change in either θt or pt . Given 	1 or 	2, the market
is composed entirely of only one type of investors - fundamentalists in the former
case and chartists in the latter. It follows that the market fraction of fundamentalists
in these cases is not sensitive to the degree of mispricing. Therefore, the following
discussions focus on the relation between the market fraction of fundamentalists and
the degree of mispricing conditional on 	3, 	4 or 	5.
An increase in κt stemming from a change in θt makes the fundamental strat-
egy more appealing to all agents regardless of their signals (through increasing its
expected utility in Eq. 9) while having no impact on the expected utility of the chartist
strategy (see Eq. 9). As more agents adopt the fundamental strategy in expectation
of gaining higher utilities, the fraction of fundamentalists increases. Theoretically,
the result is also straightforward. Conditional on 	5, mt is independent of θt , which
follows directly from Eq. 14. Conditional on 	3, as θt − pt < 0, a decline in θt is
equivalent to an increase in the degree of mispricing κt . According to Eqs. 11 and 5, a
decline in θt has no impact on the two threshold signals xmt and x
M
t so that it widens
the interval
[
θt − εt , xmt
]
. Recall that agents whose signals fall into
[
θt − εt , xmt
]
will
become fundamentalists (see Eq. 14). This implies that, conditional on 	3, a decline
in θt leads greater price inefficiency, which in turn increases the market fraction of
fundamentalists, mt . Similarly, conditional on 	4, an increase in θt is associated with
an increase in the degree of mispricing κt , which widens the interval
[
xMt , θt + εt
]
and increases mt .
An increase in the degree of mispricing resulting from a change in the price has
a different impact on the market fraction of fundamentalists. We analyze it in the
following two cases:
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(i) When chartists contribute to reducing the degree of mispricing, we have
∂ |pt − vt | /∂κt = −1, which means that |pt − vt | declines as the price ineffi-
ciency κt increases. In this case, an increase in κt increases the expected utility
of the fundamental strategy while reducing that of the chartist strategy. As a
consequence, the market fraction of fundamentalists increases for the funda-
mental strategy, which now becomes more attractive. Theoretically, the results
can be analyzed from three scenarios that correspond, respectively, to condi-
tion 	3, 	4 and 	5. Conditional on 	3, as θt − pt < 0 and chartists enhance
price efficiency, we have pt − vt < 0. Therefore, given 	3, an increase in κt
that is due to a price increase leads to a greater xmt (see Eq. 11). This results in
a widened interval
[
θt − εt , xmt
]
and a higher mt . Similarly, conditional on 	4,
as θt −pt > 0, we have pt −vt > 0. As a result, an increase in κt that originates
from a price decline leads to a smaller xMt (see Eq. 12), causing the interval[
xMt , θt + εt
]
to widen and mt to rise. Conditional on 	5, it is straightforward
to see that an increase in κt is associated with a decline in |pt − vt |, which
shrinks the interval
[
xmt , x
M
t
]
and increases mt (recall that mt = 1 − x
M
t −xmt
2εt
conditional on 	5, see Eq. 14).
(ii) When chartists enlarge the degree of mispricing, ∂ |pt − vt | /∂κt = 1, which
means|pt − vt | increases with κt . Therefore, an increase in the degree of mis-
pricing upgrades the expected utility of both strategies. Conditional on 	3 or
	4, when εt ≤ σ , a greater degree of mispricing gives a bigger boost to the
expected utility of the fundamental strategy relative to the chartist strategy,
which improves the attractiveness of fundamental strategy and increases mt .
Similarly, when εt > σ , the expected utility of fundamental strategy increases
by a smaller magnitude than that of the chartist strategy, which leads to a drop
in m. Condition 	5 implies that θt − pt ∈ [−εt , εt ]. Given that signals are uni-
formly distributed around θt , xi − pt can be either positive or negative, which
means that, while some agents expect the asset to be overpriced, others expect
it to be underpriced. In this case, greater price inefficiency κt increases the
expected utility of the chartist strategy for all agents as ∂ |pt − vt | /∂κt = 1.
However, a bigger κt only increases the expected utility of the fundamental
strategy for some agents while reducing that for others. As a result, the fraction
of fundamentalists mt declines. Theoretically, conditional on 	5, an increase in
the degree of mispricing κt leads to an increase in |pt − vt |, which widens the
interval
[
xmt , x
M
t
]
and decreases mt .
Agents trading decisions are also affected by information precision, which has an
impact on agents expected price efficiency as well as risk. Lemma 3.2 suggests that
the market fraction of fundamentalists increases with information precision.
Lemma 3.2 ∂mt/∂εt ≤ 0, where the equality holds if and only if the condition 	1,
	2 or 	5 is satisfied.
Proof see Appendix.
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Remarks Intuitively, more precise information increases the expected utility of the
fundamental strategy through reducing its expected risk, but does not affect the
expected utility of the chartist strategy. Therefore, ceteris paribus, more information
transparency enhances the attractiveness of the fundamental strategy relative to the
chartist strategy, motivating more agents to adopt the former strategy.
The result can also be interpreted from another perspective. Recall that an agent
will become a fundamentalist if and only if his expected price inefficiency, κi,t =∣∣xi,t − pt
∣∣, exceeds the threshold value εt |pt − vt | /σ , which is an increasing func-
tion of the information noise εt . The more precise the information or, equivalently,
the smaller the noise εt , the lower the minimum degree of expected price ineffi-
ciency that is sufficient to motivate fundamental trading. Holding all else constant,
as information becomes more precise, the number of agents who expect the price
inefficiency to exceed the threshold value εt |pt − vt | /σ increases, which leads to a
greater market fraction of fundamentalists, mt .
3.2 Incorporation of new information
How current price impacts existing information is an important concept for price effi-
ciency. However, how the future price is going to react to new information is perhaps
more relevant as the insight allows investors to spot profit opportunities straightfor-
wardly. The comparative analysis on the market fraction of fundamentalists enables
us to explore how future price incorporates new information on the fundamental value
in different market environment, which is termed price informativeness hereafter.
Price informativeness is measured by ∂pt+1/∂θt , the price sensitivity to a fundamen-
tal shock. By definition, the greater the value of ∂pt+1/∂θt , the more efficient the
price incorporates new information, that is, the more informative the price. In this
section, we first examine the sign and magnitude of the price informativeness mea-
sured by ∂pt+1/∂θt and then analyze the relationship between price informativeness
and various market factors.
3.2.1 Price informativeness
Proposition 1 suggests that, while the price generally responds positively to the fun-
damental shock, it can be misleading when the information noise is relatively large
(εt > βσ ) and chartists are trading more aggressively than fundamentalists to reduce
mispricing (
∣∣yct
∣∣∈
(
max
( |κt−εt |
αβσεt
, κt+εt
αε2t
)
, κt+εt
αβσεt
)
and yct (θt −pt ) > 0). The condition
for ∂pt+1/∂θt < 0 is valid if and only if εt > βσ . Proposition 1 also suggests that
the price is always informative if the information is sufficiently precise such that
εt ≤ βσ .
Proposition 1 ∂pt+1/∂θt ≥ 0 except when
∣∣yct
∣∣ ∈
(
max
( |κt−εt |
αβσεt
, κt+εt
αε2t
)
, κt+εt
αβσεt
)
,
yct (θt − pt ) > 0 and εt > βσ .
Proof see Appendix.
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Remarks We first explain the intuition behind the relatively rare scenario
that∂pt+1/∂θt < 0 by looking into the comparative trading power (measured
by the absolute demand) of fundamentalists and chartists. The condition
∣∣yct
∣∣ ∈(
max
( |κt−εt |
αβσεt
, κt+εt
αε2t
)
, κt+εt
αβσεt
)
means that the trading power of chartists exceeds that
of any fundamentalist. Note that the largest trading power of fundamentalists is κt+εt
αε2t
,
which is less than
∣∣yct
∣∣. The condition yct (θt − pt ) > 0 implies that chartists are
selling the risky asset when it is overpriced (θt < pt ) and buying it when it is
underpriced (θt > pt ), contributing to a reduction in the magnitude of mispricing.
Essentially, the condition for the price to respond negatively to a fundamental shock
is that every chartist is selling (buying) more risky assets than any fundamentalist
when the asset is overpriced (underpriced). In other words, chartists contribute more
to the mitigation of mispricing than fundamentalists. Consider a case when the asset
is overpriced. A positive fundamental shock θt raises the fundamental value θt and
reduces the expected degree of mispricing, κt , leading to a decrease in the fraction
of fundamentalists, mt , according to Lemma 3.1. Note that ∂mt/∂κt > 0 when the
change in κt is due to a fundamental shock. It is equivalent to shifting fundamen-
talists whose signals fall into [θt − εt , θt + θt − εt ] to chartists after the shock.
As chartists are selling more aggressively than any fundamentalist, such a switch of
strategy strengthens the aggregate selling force, triggering a decline in the aggregate
demand Dt and the subsequent drop in the asset price (see Eq. 17). To summarize,
the price declines in response to a positive fundamental shock when θt < pt and
−yct ∈
(
max
( |κt−εt |
αβσεt
, κt+εt
αε2t
)
, κt+εt
αβσεt
)
. The case when the asset is underpriced can be
analyzed in a similar fashion.
If
∣∣yct
∣∣ /∈
(
max
( |κt−εt |
αβσεt
, κt+εt
αε2t
)
, κt+εt
αβσεt
)
or yct (θt − pt ) ≤ 0, then ∂pt+1/∂θt ≥ 0,
which is expected to occur more frequently given the relatively loose constraints.
The intuition behind ∂pt/∂θt ≥ 0 is straightforward. When θt < pt , a positive
fundamental shock motivates agents to switch from fundamentalists to chartists,
who are either buying (yct (θt − pt ) ≤ 0) or selling less aggressively (
∣∣yct
∣∣ /∈(
max
( |κt−εt |
αβσεt
, κt+εt
αε2t
)
, κt+εt
αβσεt
)
) than fundamentalists. Whereas when θt ≥ pt , some
chartists switch to be fundamentalists, whose demand for the risky asset is not less
than that of chartists. As a result, the aggregate demand and therefore the price of
the risky asset increases after the fundamental shock, which suggests that the price is
informative. When ∂pt+1/∂θt ≥ 0, we further evaluate whether the price overreacts
or underreacts to the fundamental shock in the Appendix.
3.2.2 Overreaction
We next study whether the price overreacts or underreacts to a fundamental shock
when ∂pt+1/∂θt > 0. Given 	1, all agents are fundamentalists and respond fairly to
the fundamental value of the risky asset such that ∂pt+1/∂θt = γ /
(
αε2t
)
. We treat
this case as the benchmark. The price is said to overreact (underreact) to a fundamen-
tal shock if ∂pt+1/∂θt > (<)γ /
(
αε2t
)
. Proposition 2 highlights the environments
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that lead to overreaction to a fundamental shock. When (i) chartists’ trading activ-
ities enlarge the degree of mispricing (yct (θt − pt ) < 0) and their trading power
is sufficiently large (
∣∣yct
∣∣ ∈
(
max
( |κt−εt |
αβσεt
, −κt+εt
αε2t
)
, κt+εt
αβσεt
)
), or (ii) chartists trad-
ing activities mitigate the degree of mispricing (yct (θt − pt ) > 0) and their trading
power is moderate (
∣∣yct
∣∣ ∈
(
κt−εt
αβσεt
,min
(
κt+εt
αβσεt
, κt−εt
αε2t
))
), the price responds more
aggressively to a fundamental shock than the benchmark scenario when the market
is composed entirely of fundamentalists.
Proposition 2 ∂pt+1/∂θt > γ/
(
αε2t
)
if (i)
∣∣yct
∣∣ ∈
(
max
( |κt−εt |
αβσεt
, −κt+εt
αε2t
)
, κt+εt
αβσεt
)
,
yc (θt − pt ) < 0 and κt > max(0, εt (βσ−εt )βσ+εt ), or
∣∣yct
∣∣ ∈
(
κt−εt
αβσεt
,min
(
κt+εt
αβσεt
, κt−εt
αε2t
))
, yct (θt − pt ) > 0, κt > εt and εt < βσ ; and
∂pt+1/∂θt ≤ γ /
(
αε2t
)
otherwise.
Proof see Appendix.
Remarks We first explain why condition (i) in Proposition 2 leads to an overreac-
tion to the fundamental shock. The condition yct (θt − pt ) < 0 implies that chartists
magnify the degree of mispricing by buying the risky asset when the asset is over-
priced (θt < pt ) and selling it when it is underpriced (θt > pt ). Together with the
condition
∣∣yct
∣∣ ∈
(
max
( |κt−εt |
αβσεt
, −κt+εt
αε2t
)
, κt+εt
αβσεt
)
, these two conditions mean that
chartists buy (sell) a greater amount of the risky asset than that is sold (bought)
by any fundamentalist when the asset is overpriced (underpriced). Consider a case
when the asset is overpriced, such that θt < pt . The condition yct (θt − pt ) < 0
suggests that chartists will buy the risky asset when θt < pt , which enlarges the
degree of mispricing. If all agents act as fundamentalists, an arbitrarily small pos-
itive fundamental shock θt would increase the aggregate demand by θt/
(
αε2t
)
(see Eq. 18). In the presence of chartists, such a shock reduces the degree of mis-
pricing, κt , and decreases mt by θt/ (2εt ) according to Lemma 3.1. Recall from
Eq. 13 that the impact of a fundamental shock is equivalent to shifting agents whose
signals fall into (θt − εt , θt + θt − εt ) from fundamentalists to chartists. Note that
the maximum individual demand of these agents is less than θt+θt−pt−εt
αε2t
before the
shock (the demand of a fundamentalist increases with his signal, see Eq. 7). After the
shock, the demand of each of these agents increases to yct , where y
c
t >
θt+θt−pt+εt
αε2t
according to condition (i). So, for each agent who switches from being a funda-
mentalist to being a chartist, the demand for the risky asset increases by more than
θt+θt−pt+εt
αε2t
− θt+θt−pt−εt
αε2t
= 2
αεt
. Overall, such switching behavior increases the
aggregate demand by more than θt/
(
αε2t
)
, which leads to an overreaction to the
fundamental shock when the asset is overpriced. Similarly, we can show that the
price overreacts to the fundamental shock when the asset is underpriced, as long as
condition (i) is satisfied.
Condition (ii) in Proposition 2 means that chartists sell (buy) less aggressively
than any fundamentalists when the asset is sufficiently overpriced (underpriced). The
Price informativeness and adaptive trading 1331
conditions κt > εt and εt < βσ ensure that
∣∣yct
∣∣ ∈
(
κt−εt
αβσεt
,min
(
κt+εt
αβσεt
, κt−εt
αε2t
))
and
yct (θt − pt ) > 0 exist. Again, to explain the intuition, we consider a case when the
asset is overpriced. In this case, condition (ii) implies that both fundamentalists and
chartists sell the risky asset, and that chartists sell less aggressively than any funda-
mentalist such that yct >
−κt+εt
αε2t
. For each agent who switches from the fundamental
to the chartist strategy, his demand increases by at least 2/ (αεt ). A positive funda-
mental shock reduces the degree of mispricing κt , which decreases mt by θt/ (2εt )
according to Lemma 3.1. Such a shock increases the aggregate demand by at least
θt/
(
αε2t
)
, which is greater than the increase under the benchmark scenario when
all agents are fundamentalists. Such overreaction occurs regardless of whether the
asset is initially overpriced or underpriced. It can either fuel the bubble or accelerate
price recovery from distress.
To summarize, condition (i) or (ii) provides the necessary condition for each agent
to increase his demand by at least 2/ (αεt ) through switching from the fundamental to
the chartist strategy, which leads to overreaction compared to the benchmark scenario
when the market is composed entirely of fundamentalists. In all other scenarios not
captured by condition (i) or (ii), each switching agent may either increase the demand
by less than 2/ (αεt ) or decrease the demand. A positive fundamental shock that
reduces the market fraction of fundamentalists by θt/ (2εt ) affects the aggregate
demand by less than θt/
(
αε2t
)
, which leads to underreaction.
3.2.3 The impact of mispricing and information precision on price informativeness
How much information has been incorporated into the current price affects agents
trading behavior which in turn determines how the subsequent asset price responds
to new information. Proposition 3 suggests that the price is more informative when
the asset is more significantly mispriced, that is, when κt is larger. It implies that
price respond more sensitively to new information when less existing information
was incorporated into current price.
Proposition 3
∂
∂κt
∂pt+1
∂θt
≥ 0, where the equality holds if and only if 	1, 	2 or 	5
is satisfied.
Proof see Appendix.
Remarks To shed light on these results, consider two scenarios, with one being more
mispriced than the other. We assume that these two scenarios only differ in the degree
of mispricing. When the asset is overpriced, a positive fundamental shock θt leads
to a reduction in the degree of mispricing κt and therefore a decline in the fraction
of fundamentalists mt under both scenarios (see Lemma 3.1). Recall from Eq. 13
that the impact of a fundamental shock of size θt is equivalent to switching agents
whose signals fall into (θt − εt , θt + θt − εt ) from fundamentalists to chartists.
Among agents who switch strategy, their demand for the risky asset before the switch
is smaller under the more mispriced scenario (see Eq. 7), but their demand after the
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switch are the same in both scenarios (because the chartist strategy yields the same
demand in both scenarios). As a result, the switch from the fundamental to chartist
strategy generates a greater increase in the demand for the risky asset in the more
mispriced scenario. Therefore, the price will increase more in response to the posi-
tive fundamental shock, implying that the price is more informative when the asset
is more significantly mispriced. Similar results can be obtained when the asset is
underpriced.
The information environment also plays an important role on the incorpora-
tion of new information. Proposition 4 suggests that the price generally becomes
more informative as information becomes more precise (i.e.εt decreases). However,
when chartists trade sufficiently more aggressively than fundamentalists in enhanc-
ing market liquidity , that is,
∣∣yct
∣∣ ∈
(
max
(
3κt + 2εt
αε2t
,
|κt − εt |
αβσεt
)
,
κt + εt
αβσεt
)
and
yct (θt − pt ) > 0, increasing information precision may reduce price informative-
ness. The condition (i) εt ≥ 3βσ , or (ii) εt ∈ (2βσ, 3βσ) and κt < (εt−2βσ)εt3βσ−εt ensure
the existence of such a yct .
Proposition 4
∂
∂εt
∂pt+1
∂θt
≤ 0 except when ∣∣yct
∣∣ ∈
(
max
(
3κt + 2εt
αε2t
,
|κt − εt |
αβσεt
)
,
κt + εt
αβσεt
)
, yct (θt − pt ) > 0 and either (i) εt ≥ 3βσ ,
or (ii) εt ∈ (2βσ, 3βσ) and κt < βσεt3βσ−εt .
Proof see Appendix.
Remarks We first explain the rationale for why an improvement in
information precision reduces price informativeness when
∣∣yct
∣∣ ∈(
max
(
3κt + 2εt
αε2t
,
|κt − εt |
αβσεt
)
,
κt + εt
αβσεt
)
. Considering a case when θt < pt .
As yct (θt − pt ) > 0, the constraint on
∣∣yct
∣∣ implies that when θt < pt ,
yct < min
(−3κt − 2εt
αε2t
,
− |κt − εt |
αβσεt
)
, which means chartists sell more aggressively
than any fundamentalist when the asset is overpriced. As discussed in Proposition 1,
when there is a fundamental shock, agents switch from the fundamental to the chartist
strategy, which decreases the aggregate demand and lowers the price. Recall that the
impact of a positive fundamental shock is equivalent to shifting those whose signals
fall into (θt − εt , θt + θt − εt ) from fundamentalists to chartists. In response to the
same fundamental shock, there will be more agents switching from the fundamental
to the chartist strategy in a more transparent environment (the proportion of agents
whot switch from fundamentalists to chartists is θt2εt ). Before the switch, the demand
of the fundamentalists who will later switch strategies is greater when information
is more transparent (i.e. εt is smaller). After the switch, the demand of these agents
is the same regardless of the information environment (because they all switch to
chartists and all chartists share the same demand). It means that the switch from the
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fundamental to the chartist strategy reduces the demand by a greater amount when
the information is more transparent. Therefore, the reduction in aggregate demand
is greater when the information is more transparent. As a result, conditional on
yct < min
(−3κt − 2εt
αε2t
,
− |κt − εt |
αβσεt
)
and yct (θt − pt ) > 0, the price decreases
more in response to a positive fundamental shock when θt < pt , that is, ∂pt+1/∂θt
becomes more negative in a more transparent environment when the asset is over-
priced. Similarly, we can show that the price is less informative when θt > pt , as
long as conditions outlined in Proposition 4 are satisfied.
When
∣∣yct
∣∣ /∈
(
max
(
3κt + 2εt
αε2t
,
|κt − εt |
αβσεt
)
,
κt + εt
αβσεt
)
or yct (θt − pt ) ≤ 0, then
∂
∂εt
∂pt+1
∂θt
≤ 0. This is because the demand of agents who switch strategies in
response to a fundamental shock increases by a larger magnitude (or decreases by
a smaller magnitude) when the information is more precise. As a result, the aggre-
gate demand is more positive (or less negative), and therefore price responds more
sensitively to the fundamental shock, in a more transparent information environment.
It is worth pointing out that conditions for the price to be less informative in a more
transparent environment are quite stringent. Moreover, these conditions can only be
satisfied if the information is sufficiently noisy ((i) εt ≥ 3βσ , or (ii) εt ∈ (2βσ, 3βσ)
and κt <
βσεt
3βσ−εt ). Therefore, we shall expect the opposite scenario, that is, more
informative price in a more transparent environment, to occur more frequently.
4 Empirical evidence
4.1 Data and proxies for variables
We test the theoretical implications using data from the Institutional Brokers’
Estimate System (I/B/E/S), which collects analysts earnings estimates for listed com-
panies. We require firms in our sample to be covered by at least five analysts for
at least 24 months. The final sample includes 4754 distinct firms listed on the U.S.
stock market, with a total of 340,485 firm-month observations from January 2000 to
December 2015.
Most analysts track the cash flow of a company and forecast its future performance
based on both private and public information, making them an ideal representation
of practitioners of fundamental analysis in the real world. In fact, empirical studies
find evidence that analysts play a similar role as fundamentalists in our model - they
collect private information (Barber et al. 2010) and interpret the public information
with their comparative advantage to discover the value of the stock (Cooper et al.
2001). We therefore interpret analysts’ estimated prices as their best assessments
of the fundamental value of the underlying asset. Assuming a uniform distribution
in analysts’ estimation, the fundamental value θt can be measured by the median
of all analysts’ forecast prices in logarithm. Following Chordia et al. (2006), we
employ analysts’ forecast dispersion to measure the information dispersion about the
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fundamental value. In particular, information noise is proxied by the logarithmic dif-
ference between the maximum and the minimum target prices. Following the model
specification, the degree of mispricing, the absolute difference between the asset
price and its fundamental value, is measured by the difference between the observed
price and the median of the estimated target prices. The measure of price informative-
ness ∂pt+1/∂θt is proxied by pt+1/θt , that is, rt /θt in a discrete time horizon,
where θt is the innovation in the fundamental value.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the key variables. The information noise
εt has an average value of 21%, which implies a significant divergence in analysts’
estimation of fundamental value. The mean of the degree of mispricing, κt , is 49%,
suggesting that the price on average fluctuates 49% above or below the fundamental
value. The monthly return, rt , and the innovation of the fundamental value, θt , are
both slightly negative over the sample period. However, the standard deviation of rt is
about 1.5 times as much as that of θt , suggesting that the price is more volatile than
the fundamental value, which is consistent with the excess volatility phenomenon.
4.2 Hypothesis development
Hypothesis 1: The price is informative.
The first hypothesis follows from Proposition 1. To test whether the price is
informative, we estimate the coefficient 1 in the following regression:
rt = 1θt + ϒXt + e1,t ,
where a higher 1 stands for greater price informativeness, Xt is the set of con-
trol variables, and ϒ is the coefficient matrix. If 1 is positive and statistically
significant, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the price is informative.
Hypothesis 2: The price is more informative when the information is more
precise.
Table 1 Summary statistics
Mean Standard deviation Median Minimum Maximum Observations
pt 3.184 0.933 3.227 − 3.912 17.198 340485
θt 3.370 0.893 3.401 − 2.590 17.558 340485
εt 0.206 0.226 0.145 0.000 6.856 340485
κt 0.485 0.381 0.383 0.000 9.680 340485
rt − 0.002 0.143 0.009 − 4.191 4.300 340485
θt − 0.001 0.101 0.000 − 3.961 4.164 340485
The sample period is from January 2000 to December 2015. The variables pt and θt are the logarithmic
price and fundamental value of the stocks, κt is the degree of mispricing measured by the absolute value of
the difference between pt and θt , εt is the information noise measured by the log difference between the
maximum and the minimum target prices, θt is the innovation in θt , and rt is the stock return measured
by the first-order difference of pt
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According to Proposition 4, price informativeness can either increase or decrease
with information precision depending on the relative trading power of fundamental-
ists and chartists as well as the degree of information precision. To test the second
hypothesis, we expand the regression above by adding the interaction between θt
and the noise measure εt such that
rt = 1θt + 2 (θt · εt ) + ϒXt + e2,t ,
where 2 is the coefficient of the interaction term. A statistically significant and
negative (positive) estimate of 2 supports the hypothesis that the degree of price
informativeness increases (decreases) with information precision. As the conditions
for price informativeness to decrease with information precision are quite restric-
tive, the positive relation between price informativeness and information precision is
expected to dominate.
Hypothesis 3: The price is more informative when existing mispricing is more
severe.
The third hypothesis follows directly from Proposition 3. In the same vein, to test
whether the price is more informative when the asset is more significantly mispriced,
we estimate the following equation:
rt = 1θt + 3 (θt · κt ) + ϒXt + e3,t ,
where 3 is the coefficient of the interaction between the fundamental innovation
θt and the degree of mispricing κt . If the estimated coefficient 3 is statistically
significant and positive (negative), then one cannot reject the null hypothesis that
price is more (less) informative when less existing information has been incorporated
into the price. We expect the positive relation between price informativeness and the
degree of mispricing to dominate because the conditions for it to hold are relatively
loose compared to the alternative scenario.
4.3 Estimation results
Table 2 presents the estimation results. All regressions control for firm-level fixed
effects. The estimated coefficient of θt reported in column 1 is statistically sig-
nificant and positive, which supports Hypothesis 1 (implied by Proposition 1) that
the price is informative. Raising the fundamental value by 10% increases the return
by 5.1%. There is no one-to-one relation between the change in the fundamental
value and the asset price. But the positive coefficient indicates positive comovement
between the asset price and the fundamental value.
Column 2 reports the results of the estimation that includes the interaction between
the fundamental innovation θt and information noise εt . The estimated coefficient
of the interaction term is negative and statistically significant, which means the return
is less responsive to the fundamental innovation θt when the information is more
opaque. In other words, price is more informative when the information is more pre-
cise, which supports Hypothesis 2. It suggests that the positive relation between price
informativeness and information precision dominates. The result is also intuitive, as
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investors are more confident to act on information with greater precision, which helps
incorporate information into the price more efficiently.
Column 3 reports the estimation results that account for the interaction between
the fundamental innovation, θt , and the degree of mispricing, κt . The coefficient
of the interaction term is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that price
is more informative when the asset is originally more significantly mispriced, which
supports Hypothesis 3 (implied by Proposition 3). In particular, a 10% increase in the
magnitude of mispricing raises the sensitivity of the return to fundamental innova-
tion,θt , by 1.3 percentage point. Noted that greater mispricing means more existing
information fails to be incorporated into the price. When there is a fundamental
shock, the price will not only respond to the new information but also the existing
information, which magnifies the price sensitivity to the fundamental shock.
Column 4 reports the results that include both interaction terms. Column 5 reports
the results from a similar regression as Column 4 but controls for not only firm but
also year fixed effects. The finding that the price is more informative when the infor-
mation is more precise and the asset is more significantly mispriced remains robust.
For robustness checks, we proxy the actual fundamental value and the information
Table 2 Estimation results: impact of market elements on price informativeness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
θt 0.511*** 0.564*** 0.341*** 0.391*** 0.388***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
θt · εt − 0.057*** − 0.059*** − 0.061***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
θt · κt 0.131*** 0.215*** 0.212***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
εt − 0.012*** 0.046*** 0.039***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
κt − 0.326*** − 0.345*** − 0.362***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant − 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.066*** 0.047*** 0.098***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect No No No No Yes
Observations 340,485 340,485 340,485 340,485 340,485
R-squared 0.154 0.155 0.319 0.329 0.339
The dependent variable is the monthly asset return, rt , calculated as the log difference of the price. The
fundamental shock, θt , is the innovation in the median target price reported by analysts covering the
stock, εt is the information noise measured by the log difference between the maximum and the minimum
target prices, κt is the market illiquidity measured by the absolute value of the log difference between the
price and the median target price. All regressions control for firm fixed effect. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Significance levels at 1, 5 and 10 percentage points are indicated, respectively, by ***, **,
and *
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noise by the mean and the standard deviation of the analysts’ target prices, calculate
robust and/or clustered standard errors. In the results not reported, our key results
that the price is informative and that price informativeness improves with the degree
of mispricing and information precision remain robust.
5 Conclusion
We propose a structural model with endogenized market fraction of fundamentalists
and chartists to understand the determinants of price informativeness. In a mar-
ket with asymmetric information, utility-maximizing investors strategically switch
between heterogeneous trading strategies, accounting for dynamic market conditions.
Such utility-maximizing behavior motivates them to react to information selectively
and to place trading orders adaptively. Their trading behavior incorporates new infor-
mation regarding the fundamental value in an evolutionary and adaptive process. This
paper shows that greater degree of mispricing and more precise information enhances
future price informativeness by motivating more investors to adopt a fundamental
strategy that responds positively to innovation in the fundamental value as well as
existing information that has not yet been incorporated into price, which consistently
contribute to improve price discovery. These theoretical predictions are supported by
empirical evidence.
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Appendix
Proof
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof Differentiating mt with respect to the degree of mispricing κt yields
∂mt
∂κt
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if 	1 or 	2
1
2εt
− 1
2σ
∂ |pt − vt |
∂κt
if 	3 or 	4
− 1
σ
∂ |pt − vt |
∂κt
if 	5
.
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A marginal change in κt = |θt − pt | can originate from a change in the funda-
mental value θt or the price pt . If an increase in market illiquidity comes from a
change in θt , then ∂ |pt − vt | /∂κt = 0, which leads to ∂mt/∂κt > 0 if 	3 or 	4 and
∂m/∂κt = 0 if 	5.
If the change in κt is due to a change in pt , the relation between mt and κt depends
on the trading directions of the fundamental and the chartist strategies as well as the
information noise. When chartists improve market liquidity, i.e. pt − vt > 0 and
κt = θt − pt > 0, or pt − vt < 0 and κt = pt − θt > 0, then ∂ |pt − vt | /∂κt = −1,
which leads to ∂mt/∂κt > 0 conditional on 	3, 	4 or 	5. When chartists enhance
mispricing, then ∂ |pt − vt | /∂κt = 1. In this case, ∂mt/∂κt < 0 if 	5 holds. Condi-
tional on	3 or	4, ∂mt/∂κt > 0 if εt < σ, ∂mt/∂κt < 0 if εt > σ , and ∂mt/∂κt = 0
if εt = σ .
To summarize, ∂mt/∂κt ≤ 0 if (i)∂ |pt − vt | /∂κt = 1 and 	5, or (ii)
∂ |pt − vt | /∂κt = 1 and εt ≤ σ conditional on 	3 or 	4; otherwise, ∂mt/∂κt ≥
0.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof Differentiating mt with respect to the information noise εt yields
∂mt
∂εt
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if 	1 or 	2
∂xmt
∂εt
εt−xmt +θt
2ε2t
if 	3
− ∂xMt
∂εt
εt−θt+xMt
2ε2t
if 	4
− ∂xMt
∂εt
εt+ ∂x
m
t
∂εt
εt+xMt −xmt
2ε2t
if 	5
.
Recall the definition of xmt and x
M
t in Eqs. 11 and 5,
∂xmt
∂εt
= − |pt − vt |
σ
, and
∂xMt
∂εt
= |pt − vt |
σ
.
So, ∂mt/∂εt can be rewritten as
∂mt
∂εt
=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if 	1, 	2 or 	5
θt−pt
2ε2t
if 	3
pt−θt
2ε2t
if 	4
.
Given 	3 =
{
xmt , x
M
t | xmt ∈ [θt − εt , θt + εt ] and θt + εt < xMt
}
, it must be
true that −εt |pt − vt | /σ + εt > θt − pt , −εt |pt − vt | /σ − εt < θt − pt and
εt |pt − vt | /σ − εt > θt −pt . If εt |pt − vt | /σ − εt > −εt |pt − vt | /σ + εt , that is,
|pt − vt | > σ , for	3 to be true, it must be that θt −pt < −εt |pt − vt | /σ +εt , which
suggests θt −pt < 0. If, on the other hand, εt |pt − vt | /σ − εt ≤ −εt |pt − vt | /σ +
εt , that is, |pt − vt | ≤ σ , it must be true that θt − pt < εt |pt − vt | /σ − εt ≤ 0.
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Therefore, given 	3, θt − pt < 0 and therefore ∂m/∂εt < 0. Similarly, we can show
that θt − pt > 0 given 	4 =
{
xmt , x
M
t | xMt ∈ [θt − εt , θt + εt ] and θt − εt > xmt
}
,
which leads to ∂mt/∂εt < 0. In conclusion, ∂mt/∂εt ≤ 0, which suggests that
smaller information noise or greater information transparency increases the fraction
of fundamentalists in the market.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof Differentiating the price pt+1 in Eq. 17 with respect to the fundamental yields
∂pt+1
∂θt
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
γ
αε2t
if 	1 or 	5
0 if 	2
γ
2αεt
(
pt − θt + εt
ε2t
+ pt − vt
βσ 2
)
if 	3
γ
2αεt
(
θt − pt + εt
ε2t
− pt − vt
βσ 2
)
if 	4
.
Recall that θt < pt given 	3, ∂pt+1/∂θt > 0 if pt ≥ vt . If pt < vt , then
∂pt+1/∂θt ≤ 0 if and only if pt−vtβσ 2 < θt−pt−εtε2t . As x
m
t ∈ (θt − εt , θt + εt ),
xMt > θt + εt and xmt = εt (pt − vt ) /σ + pt conditional on 	3, it follows that
pt−vt
βσ 2
∈
(
θt−pt−εt
βσεt
,
−|θt−pt+εt |
βσεt
)
when pt < vt . Therefore, ∂pt+1/∂θt < 0 if
pt−vt
βσ 2
falls into
(
θt−pt−εt
βσεt
,min
(−|θt−pt+εt |
βσεt
,
θt−pt−εt
ε2t
))
, which is valid if and only if
εt > βσ ; otherwise ∂pt+1/∂θt ≥ 0. Clearly, it is impossible for ∂pt+1/∂θt < 0 if
εt > βσ . Recall the demand function of chartists in Eq. 8, given that κt = |θt − pt |,
the condition for ∂pt+1/∂θt < 0 is yct ∈
(−κt−εt
αβσεt
,min
(−|θt−pt+εt |
αβσεt
, −κt−εt
αε2t
))
and
εt > βσ .
Similarly, we can show that, given 	4, ∂pt+1/∂θt < 0 if yc ∈(
max
( |θt−pt−εt |
αβσεt
, κt+εt
αε2t
)
, κt+εt
αβσεt
)
and εt > βσ ; and ∂pt+1/∂θt ≥ 0 otherwise.
If κt > εt , then − |θt − pt + εt | = θt − pt + εt = − (κt − εt ) condi-
tional on 	3, and |θt − pt − εt | = κt − εt conditional on 	4. If κt ≤ εt , then
− |θt − pt + εt | = (κt − εt ) conditional on 	3, and |θt − pt − εt | = − (κt − εt )
conditional on 	4. So the condition for ∂pt+1/∂θt < 0 can be summarized as∣∣yct
∣∣ ∈
(
max
( |κt−εt |
αβσεt
, κt+εt
αε2t
)
, κt+εt
αβσεt
)
, yct (θt − pt ) > 0 and εt > βσ .
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof Given 	3, θt < pt , yct ∈
{( |κt−εt |
αβσεt
, κt+εt
αβσεt
)
∪
(−κt−εt
αβσεt
,
−|κt−εt |
αβσεt
)}
, and
∂pt+1
∂θt
− γ
αε2t
= γ
2αεt
(
pt − θt − εt
ε2t
+ pt − vt
βσ 2
)
.
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So
∂pt+1
∂θt
>
γ
αε2t
if (i) yct ∈
(
max
( |κt−εt |
αβσεt
, −κt+εt
αε2t
)
, κt+εt
αβσεt
)
, which exists if and
only if θt −pt < min
(
0, εt (εt−βσ)
βσ+εt
)
; or (ii) yct ∈
(
max
(−κt−εt
αβσεt
, −κt+εt
αε2t
)
,
−|κt−εt |
αβσεt
)
,
which exists if and only if θt − pt < −εt and εt < βσ .
Given 	4, θt − pt > 0, yct ∈
{( |κt−εt |
αβσεt
, κt+εt
αβσεt
)
∪
(−κt−εt
αβσεt
,
−|κt−εt |
αβσεt
)}
, and
∂pt+1
∂θt
− γ
αε2t
= γ
2αεt
(
θt − pt − εt
ε2t
− pt − vt
βσ 2
)
.
So
∂pt+1
∂θt
>
γ
Aε2t
if (i) yct ∈
(−κt−εt
αβσεt
,min
(−|κt−εt |
αβσεt
, κt−εt
αε2t
))
, which exists if and
only if θt −pt > max(0, εt (βσ−εt )βσ+εt ); or (ii) yct ∈
( |κt−εt |
αβσεt
,min
(
κt+εt
αβσεt
, κt−εt
αε2t
))
, which
exists if and only if θt − pt > εt and εt < βσ .
Clearly
∂pt+1
∂θt
≤ γ
αε2t
conditional on 	1, 	2 and 	5.
To summarize,
∂pt+1
∂θt
>
γ
αε2t
if and only if (i)
∣∣yct
∣∣ ∈
(
max
( |κt−εt |
αβσεt
, −κt+εt
αε2t
)
, κt+εt
αβσεt
)
, yct (θt − pt ) < 0 and κt > max(0, εt (βσ−εt )βσ+εt ), or
(ii)
∣∣yct
∣∣ ∈
( |κt−εt |
αβσεt
,min
(
κt+εt
αβσεt
, κt−εt
αε2t
))
, yct (θt − pt ) > 0, κt > εt and εt < βσ .
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof Differentiating ∂pt+1/∂θt with respect to the degree of mispricing κt yields
∂
∂κt
∂pt+1
∂θt
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if 	1, 	2 or 	5
γ
2αεt
(
1
ε2t
+ 1
βσ 2
∂ (pt − vt )
∂κt
)
if 	3
γ
2αεt
(
1
ε2t
− 1
βσ 2
∂ (pt − vt )
∂κt
)
if 	4
.
Recall that κt = pt − θt given 	3, ∂ (pt − vt ) /∂κt = 0 if the change in κt is due
to a change in θt , and
∂ (pt − vt )
∂κt
= 1 if the change in κt is due to a change in pt .
Similarly, as θt > pt conditional on 	4, ∂ (pt − vt ) /∂κt = 0 if the change in κt is
due to a change in θt . Otherwise, ∂ (pt − vt ) /∂κt = −1. Therefore, ∂
∂κt
∂pt+1
∂θt
>
0 conditional on 	3 or 	4, which suggests that the price is more responsive to a
fundamental shock when the market becomes more inefficient (κt becomes larger).
To summarize, we have
∂
∂κt
∂pt+1
∂θt
≥ 0, where the equality holds if 	1, 	2 or 	5 is
satisfied.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Proof Differentiating ∂pt/∂θt with respect to the information noise εt yields
∂
∂εt
∂pt+1
∂θt
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
− γ
αε3t
if 	1 or 	5
0 if 	2
− γ
2αε2t
[
3 (pt − θt ) + 2εt
ε2t
+ pt − vt
βσ 2
]
if 	3
− γ
2αε2t
[
3 (θt − pt ) + 2εt
ε2t
− pt − vt
βσ 2
]
if 	4
.
Given 	3,
∂
∂εt
∂pt+1
∂θt
> 0 if yct <
3 (θt − pt ) − 2εt
αε2t
< 0. When pt <
vt , yct ∈
(
θt−pt−εt
αβσεt
,
−|θt−pt+εt |
αβσεt
)
conditional on 	3. Recall that θt < pt con-
ditional on 	3 and that κt = |θt − pt |, ∂
∂εt
∂pt+1
∂θt
> 0 if and only if
yct ∈
(−κt − εt
αβσεt
,min
(−3κt − 2εt
αε2t
,
− |κt − εt |
αβσεt
))
, which exists if
−3κt + εt
ε2t
>
−κt − εt
βσεt
, that is (i) εt ≥ 3βσ , or (ii) εt ∈ (2βσ, 3βσ) and κt < (εt−2βσ)εt3βσ−εt .
Similarly, given 	4,
∂
∂εt
∂pt+1
∂θt
> 0 if yct ∈
[
max
(
3κt + 2εt
αε2t
,
|κt − εt |
αβσεt
)
,
κt + εt
αβσεt
]
, which exists if (i) εt ≥ 3βσ , or (ii)
εt ∈ (2βσ, 3βσ) and κt < (εt−2βσ)εt3βσ−εt .
To summarize,
∂
∂εt
∂pt+1
∂θt
≥ 0 if and only if ∣∣yct
∣∣ ∈
(
max
(
3κt + 2εt
αε2t
,
|κt − εt |
αβσεt
)
,
κt + εt
αβσεt
)
, yct (θt − pt ) > 0 and either (i) εt ≥ 3βσ ,
or (ii) εt ∈ (2βσ, 3βσ) and κt < (εt−2βσ)εt3βσ−εt .
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